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Summary. The decision-theoretic literature has developed very few techniques
to bound the expected utility of a random variable when only simple statistics
like its median or mode or mean are known. One reason for this lack of results
is that we are missing a convenient way to link probability theory and expected
utility. This paper is written to demonstrate a general (and genuinely probabilistic)
technique to obtain upper and lower bounds for the expected utility of a lottery.
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1 Introduction
The theoretical importance of the expected utility model in the study of behavior
under risk is unquestioned. Its practical use, however, is hampered by many
difficulties. One of these is that both the agent’s utility function U and the
cumulative distribution function F of the random variable X must be available
in order to compute EU (X ). In reality, one has often to settle for much less since
either U or F may be imperfectly known.
This leads to the problem of estimating expected utilities when the relevant
information is incomplete. For example, suppose that the agent is known to be
risk averse but that her (increasing) utility function U is not fully specified. If
the expected value E (X ) of the random variable X exists, Jensen’s inequality
implies that her expected utility EU (X ) for X is bounded above by the utility of
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E (X ). This is sufficient to conclude that any sure outcome x > E (X ) is preferred
to X .
More generally, however, the decision-theoretic literature has largely been
silent on the problem of estimating bounds for the expected utility when only
little information about either X or U is known. Although there is a significant
area of probability theory specializing in techniques to establish inequalities,
these have not been brought to bear on the problem.
To my knowledge, the most notable exceptions are the following. Vickson
(1977) studies the case where the utility function U (x ) is known only at a number
of points. Willassen (1981, respectively, 1990) applies the general theory of
Tchebycheff bounds to derive upper and lower bounds for EU (X ) when the first
two (respectively, three) moments of X are known and the first three (respectively,
four) derivatives of U alternate in sign. Birge and Teboulle (1989) assumes
convexity of U and applies techniques based on the knowledge of the moments
of X .
One reason for this shortage of results is that we are missing a convenient
way to link probability theory and expected utility. The purpose of this paper is
to demonstrate a general (and genuinely probabilistic) technique to derive upper
and lower bounds for the expected utility of a random variable. This technique
may accomodate different assumptions about the knowledge available on U and
F . For example, Theorem 12 below provides a lower bound for the expected
utility of a risk averse agent; Theorems 3, 9, and 10, instead, deal with the S -
shaped utility functions advocated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)’s prospect
theory.
To describe our technique, let us agree to write X  F to denote that the
random variable (r.v.) X has a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F . The
basic idea is based on a probabilistic interpretation of the expected utility model
advanced in Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996). Assume that the utility function U is
bounded, increasing (but not constant) and continuous. By an appropriate positive
affine transformation, normalize U so that infU (x ) = 0 and supU (x ) = 1.
Then U satisfies all the properties characterizing a c.d.f., as was first noted in
Berhold (1973).
Therefore, there exists (on some appropriate probability space) a random
variable V with cumulative distribution function U . Moreover, the r.v. V  U
can be taken to be stochastically independent of any given X  F . See Theorem
14.1 in Billingsley (1986). This implies that we can let U (x ) = P (V  x ) and
rewrite the expected utility of X as
EU (X ) =
Z
U (x ) dF (x ) =
Z
P (V  x ) dF (x ) = P (X  V ): (1)
Hence, the problem to derive bounds on EU (X ) can be attacked by studying how
to bound the probability that the r.v. X  F is greater than another (stochastically
independent) r.v. V  U .
It is worthwhile pausing a bit on the dual role of U . In the expected utility
model, this is a (von Neumann and Morgenstern) utility function; in this paper,
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instead, we assume infU (x ) = 0 and supU (x ) = 1 and exploit the fact that U can
be considered a cumulative distribution function. Bordley and LiCalzi (2000) and
Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996) argue at some length on the possible advantages
of this second viewpoint in a decision-theoretic context. Here, however, all that
is needed is that the equality displayed in Equation (1) holds true and therefore
that bounding P (X  V ) is tantamount to bounding EU (X ).
The paper stresses this point in two ways. First, we write the statement of
our results in terms of bounds on EU (X ) but provide proofs with reference to
P (X  V ). Second, we let our discussion liberally switch between the first and
the second interpretation of U depending on the context.
2 Preliminaries
Unless explicitly noted, we assume throughout the paper that U is continuous.
This natural but slightly restrictive assumption can be axiomatically justified in
the expected utility model. See Grandmont (1972). Its purpose here is to rule
out some minor technicalities regarding the Riemann-Stieltjes integral involved
in Equation (1). On the other hand, note that we make no assumptions on the
c.d.f. F .
We also follow two simplifying conventions. First, we take the domain of
the c.d.f. F of a r.v. X to be the set of extended reals IR . Hence, F is positive,
increasing, right-continuous and such that F (−1) = 0 and F (+1) = 1. Second,
we consistently pair the r.v.’s X ;Y ;Z ;V with their respective c.d.f.’s F ;G ;H ;U
so that X  F , Y  G , Z  H , and V  U throughout the paper.
Our first result is a simple equality.
Theorem 1 Let Z1 and Z2 be two r.v.’s uniformly distributed on [0; 1], respec-
tively stochastically independent of X and V . Then
EU (X ) = P (U (X )  Z1) = P (Z2  F (V )):
Proof. We prove only the first equality. By the monotonicity of U , P (X  V ) =
P (U (X )  U (V )). Take Z1 d=U (V ) and stochastically independent of X . ut
This result is not interesting, but it illustrates a point. When working on
bounds for P (X  V ), one may often obtain different statements depending on
whether X or V are considered. Hence, many of our results admit two distinct
formulations which are however based essentially on the same proof. When both
formulations are offered, we always omit the proof of the dual result.
3 Cut-off inequalities
Given X  F and Y  G , we say that X (first-order) stochastically dominates
Y and we write X st Y if and only if F (x )  G(x ) for all x 2 IR . Our first
result is also proved as Thm. 3.4 in Wrather and Yu (1982, p. 322).
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Theorem 2 Suppose that X st V . Then EU (X )  1=2.
Proof. By stochastic dominance, U (x )  F (x ) for all x . Hence,
P (X  V ) =
Z
U (x ) dF (x ) 
Z
F (x ) dF (x ) = 1=2 : ut
Recall that we assume U bounded between 0 and 1. Hence, the expected
utility of an arbitrary r.v. X is a number in [0; 1]. Thus, the assumption that
U (x )  F (x ) for all x guarantees that EU (X ) achieves a value that is at least
halfway in the interval [0; 1]. This lower bound is sharp: just take a stochastically
independent r.v. X d=V (i.e., F = U ) and check that EU (X ) = 1=2.
This result may be extended into two directions. The first one restricts the
family of random variables out of which X and V may be chosen; the second
one allows for a finer ordering.
We say that a r.v. X  F is symmetric if there exists some m in IR such that
F (m − x ) + F (m + x ) = 1 for almost all x 2 IR . We call m the symmetric median
of X ; in fact, when F is continuous, taking limits for x ! 0 in the previous
equality gives F (m) = 1=2. Our definition implies that m is unique even if the
set of x ’s such that F (x ) = 1=2 is not a singleton. A version of the next result
appears in DellaVigna (1997).
Theorem 3 Let X and V be symmetric r.v.’s respectively with symmetric medi-
ans mX and mV . Suppose that at least one between X and V has an absolutely
continuous c.d.f. Then
mX  mV if and only if EU (X )  1=2;
with equality holding if mX = mV .
Proof. Since X is symmetric, dF (mX + y) + dF (mX − y) = 0. Hence,
P (X  V ) =
Z +1
−1
U (x ) dF (x ) =
Z mX
−1
U (x ) dF (x ) +
Z +1
mX
U (x ) dF (x )
= −
Z +1
0
U (mX − y) dF (mX − y) +
Z +1
0
U (mX + y) dF (mX + y)
=
Z +1
0

U (mX − y) + U (mX + y)

dF (mX + y):
Consider the argument of the last integral. If mX = mV , the symmetry of V
implies U (mX − y) +U (mX + y) = 1 a.e., with equality holding everywhere if U
is continuous. Hence, by the absolute continuity of F or U ,
P (X  V ) =
Z +1
0

U (mX − y) + U (mX + y)

dF (mX + y)
=
Z +1
0
dF (mX + y) = 12 :
If instead mX − mV = " > 0, then
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U (mX − y) + U (mX + y) = U (mV + " − y) + U (mV + " + y)
 U (mV − y) + U (mV + y) = 1
and therefore
P (X  V ) =
Z +1
0

U (mX − y) + U (mX + y)

dF (mX + y)

Z +1
0
dF (mX + y) = 12 :
For mX − mV = " < 0, reverse the above argument. ut
When V is symmetric, its c.d.f. U is S -shaped around the inflexion point mV .
In the language of expected utility, then, the assumptions of Theorem 3 imply
a utility function U consistent with the reflection effect described in Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), provided that the agent sets her reference point to mV .
Assuming this type of utility function and a choice set of symmetric r.v.’s,
Theorem 3 implies that one may learn a lot just from comparing their (symmetric)
medians: a (symmetric) r.v. X with mX  mV must have a higher expected utility
than any other (symmetric) r.v. Y with mY < mV . This suggests a simple rule
to prune the choice set of this kind of expected utility maximizer when she is
choosing over symmetric r.v.’s: if there is an available lottery X with mX  mV ,
ignore all r.v.’s with mY  mV .
We call this rule search over (symmetric) medians. Searching over symmetric
medians can be used to partition all r.v.’s into two classes: those with (sym-
metric) median above and respectively below mV . Only r.v.’s in the first class
are candidates to maximize the expected utility. Note that this rule cannot be
strengthened to say that mX > mY implies EU (X ) > EU (Y ): for instance, if X
takes values 0 and 4 and Y takes values 1=2 and 3=2 (both with equal proba-
bility), then mx = 2 > 1 = mY ; however, for V uniformly distributed on [0; 1],
EU (X ) = 1=2 < 3=4 = EU (Y ). The direct comparison of medians between r.v.’s
in the same class is not conclusive.
A second extension of the cut-off inequality in Theorem 2 is inspired by ideas
first presented in Karlin and Novikoff (1963). We say that a c.d.f. F crosses from
below another c.d.f. U if there exists a point c2 IR  such that F (x )  U (x ) for
all x  c and F (x )  U (x ) for all x > c. Note that, using the right-continuity
of F and U , this implies F (c)  U (c) and thus F (c) = U (c). Also, note that c
is an extended real. When F crosses U from below in c = +1, then X st V .
A version of the next result appears in Nieddu (1997).
Theorem 4 Let X  F and V  U be such that F crosses U from below in c.
Then
F (c) − F
2(c)
2
 EU (X )  1 + F
2(c)
2
: (2)
Similarly, if U crosses F from below, then
1 − F 2(c)
2
 EU (X )  1 − F (c) + F
2(c)
2
: (3)
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Proof. We prove only the upper bound of the first set of inequalities.
P (X  V ) =
Z c
−1
U (x ) dF (x ) +
Z +1
c
U (x ) dF (x )
 U (c)F (c) +
Z +1
c
F (x ) dF (x ) = 1 + F
2(c)
2
:
The other bounds follow from similar arguments. ut
Differently from the previous ones, this result provides both upper and lower
(non trivial) bounds. It is then interesting to consider the length of the interval
of possible values for EU (X ). Taking the difference between upper and lower
bound in Equation (2), we find 1=2− F (c) + F 2(c). This value is minimized for
F (c) = 1=2; that is, when F crosses U from below (or from above) at the median
of X . In this case, Equation (2) provides the tight bound 3=8  EU (X )  5=8.
Analogous conclusion holds for Equation (3).
The bounds are sharp. For instance, assume that V is uniformly distributed
on [0; 1] so that U (x ) = minf1;maxf0; xgg. If the c.d.f. of X is F (x ) = 0 for
x < 1=2 and F (x ) = minfx ; 1g for x  1=2 so that F crosses U from below at
the median of X , then EU (x ) = 5=8. Finally, note that when F crosses U from
below in c = +1, Theorem 4 implies Theorem 2.
4 Quantile-based inequalities
We say that a point x in IR is of strict increase for a c.d.f. F if F (x−") < F (x+")
for all " > 0. The support of F is the set of its points of strict increase and will
be denoted by SF . Note that SF is a closed subset of IR ; moreover, F is strictly
increasing (and hence invertible) on its support if and only if SF is an interval.
The generalized inverse function of a c.d.f. F is
F (−1)(z ) = inffx 2 IR  : F (x )  zg:
The generalized inverse F (−1) : [0; 1] ! IR  is positive, increasing, left-
continuous and such that F (−1)(0) = −1 and F (−1)(1) = sup SF . Moreover,
for any point x in the support of F , F (−1)F (x ) = x ; in particular, if SF is an
interval, F (−1) = F−1 on F (SF ).
Let X  F . Given  2 [0; 1], we say that x = F (−1)() is the -quantile
of F . The -quantile exists and is unique for any  2 [0; 1]. Given 0 = 0 <
1 < 2 < : : : < n < n+1 = 1, we denote the corresponding quantiles of F by
x(0); x(1); : : : ; x(n); x(n+1). Note that x(0) = −1 and x(n+1) = sup SF .
The results in this section concern the case where only the values of a few
quantiles are known for either U or F . Since in applications it is usually the case
that there is less information about U than about F , we cast our presentation in
terms of the quantiles v(0); v(1); : : : ; v(n); v(n+1) of U .
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Theorem 5 Suppose that the support of U is an interval [a;+1). Given any r.v.
X  F,
n −
nX
k=1
F (vk )[k − k−1]  EU (X )  1 −
nX
k=1
F (vk )[k+1 − k ]: (4)
Proof. Breaking up the domain of integration,
P (X  V ) =
Z +1
−1
P (V  x ) dF (x ) =
nX
k=0
Z v(k+1)
v(k )
P (V  x ) dF (x ): (5)
For each term in the sum, consider the inequalities
k

F (v(k+1)) − F (v(k ))
 
Z v(k+1)
v(k )
P (V  x ) dF (x ) 
 U (v(k+1))

F (v(k+1)) − F (v(k ))

:
(6)
Since U is invertible on U ([a;+1)), U (v(k+1)) = k+1. Hence, substituting Equa-
tion (6) into Equation (5), we obtain
nX
k=0
k

F (v(k+1)) − F (v(k ))
  P (V  X ) 

nX
k=0
k+1

F (v(k+1)) − F (v(k ))

:
(7)
Noting that F (sup SU ) = F (+1) = 1, the result follows by rearranging the sums.
ut
The applicability of this result is immediate. After a once-and-for-all estimate
of a few -quantiles of U , bounding the expected utility of a r.v. X  F requires
only to compute the values of its c.d.f. at these quantiles. Theorem 5 may also be
easily generalized to accomodate the assumption that sup SU < +1 or that the
support of U is not an interval. However, we think it more effective to maintain
here these two mild restrictions and pause on the special case where only the
median of U is known.
For  = 1=2, the -quantile of F is called the median of X , that we keep
denoting by mX . Note that the symmetric median of a symmetric r.v. X  F (as
defined just before Theorem 3) always coincides with its median m , except for
the very special case where F (m) = 1=2 and m is not a point of strict increase
for F : then it is strictly greater than its median.
Corollary 6 Suppose that the support of U is an interval [a;+1) and let its
median be m. Given any r.v. X  F,
1 − F (m)
2
 EU (X )  2 − F (m)
2
: (8)
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Proof. First, note that the proof of Theorem 5 still goes through when sup SU =
+1. Then substitute n = 1 with 1 = 1=2 in Equation (4). ut
The bounds in Corollary 6 are (asymptotically) sharp. For instance, take the
exponential utility function U (x ) = 1 − e−x and assume that any r.v. Xk in the
choice set is exponentially distributed with parameter k > 0. Then the median of
U is m = log 2 and the expected utility of Xk is EU (Xk ) = 1=(1 + k ). Corollary 6
provides the bounds
1
2k+1
 EU (Xk )  1 + 2
k
2k+1
:
As k ! 0, both EU (Xk ) and the upper bound tend to 1. Similarly, as k ! +1,
both EU (Xk ) and the lower bound tend to 0. Analogous results of (asymptotic)
sharpness hold for the bounds in Theorem 5.
Corollary 6 leads to another result that is probably more interesting from a
decision-theoretic point of view.
Corollary 7 Suppose that the support of U is an interval [a;+1). Let mX and
mV be respectively the medians of X and V .
i) If mX = mV , then 1=4  EU (X )  3=4.
ii) If mX > mV , then EU (X )  1=4.
iii) If mX < mV , then EU (X )  3=4.
Proof. Note that 1=2 = F (mX )  F (mV ) if and only if mX  mV and derive the
results from the bounds in Equation (8). ut
When U satisfies the assumptions of Corollary 7, this suggests another simple
rule to prune the choice set of an expected utility maximizer choosing over
arbitrary r.v.’s. If there exists a r.v. X such that EU (X )  3=4, ignore all r.v.’s
y Y with mY  mV . We call this rule searching over medians.
The results in this section admit dual formulations when there is incomplete
information about the c.d.f. F . For the sake of brevity, here we only state (and
do not prove) the equivalent of Theorem 5. Given X  F and 0 = 0 < 1 <
: : : < n < n+1 = 1, denote the respective quantiles of F by x(0); x(1); : : : ; x(n+1).
Note that U is not required to be continuous.
Theorem 8 Suppose that the r.v. X has a continuous c.d.f. F whose support is
an interval [a;+1). Given any increasing, bounded (but possibly not continuous)
utility function U ,
nX
k=1
U (x(k ))[k+1 − k ]  EU (X ) 
nX
k=0
U (x(k+1))[k+1 − k ]: (9)
5 Mode-based inequalities
We say that a r.v. X  F is unimodal if there exists a mode M 2 IR such that F
is convex on (−1;M ) and concave on (M ;+1). For simplicity, in the following
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we assume that the mode of X is unique, but our results may be generalized to
the case of multiple modes. Note that, except possibly in x = M , the c.d.f. F of
a unimodal r.v. X is continuous.
When V is unimodal, its c.d.f. U is S -shaped around the inflexion point mV .
However, differently from the case of a symmetric V , the two arms of the S
may not have the same curvature. Hence, this kind of utility function is consistent
not only with the reflection effect, but with a steeper slope over losses as well.
This makes it a prominent candidate as value function for the prospect theory of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Theorem 9 Suppose that V  U is unimodal with mode M . Let U be absolutely
continuous with density function u and inf SU  0. If the r.v. X is positive and
integrable, then
EU (X )  u(M )E (X ): (10)
Proof. Since M is the mode of u , u(v)  u(M ) for all v in SU . Hence,
P (X  V ) =
Z
SU
P (X  v)u(v) dv  u(M )
Z
SU
P (X  v) dv
= u(M )
Z
SU
(1 − F (v)) dv  u(M )E (X );
where the second equality follows from the fact that the set on which P (X 
v) = P (X > v) has Lebesgue measure zero. The last inequality exploits the
well-known equality (see Shiryayev, 1984, Corollary II.6.2, p. 206)
E (X ) =
Z +1
0
(1 − F (x )) dx ;
controlling for SU  [0;+1). ut
Whenever u(M ) < 1=E (X ), this simple inequality is not trivial. Let us con-
sider an example. Suppose that both X and V are exponentially distributed
with parameters respectively  > 0 and  > 0. In particular, this implies
U (x ) = maxf0; 1− e−xg. Then E (X ) = 1= while the mode of V is M = 0, so
that U (M ) = . Theorem 9 states that
EU (X ) = 
 + 
 

= u(M )E (X )
and the upper bound is more and more binding as = ! 0. In particular, note
that V st X if and only if   . Hence, by the dual to Theorem 2, for  < 
we might derive the upper bound EU (X )  1=2. However, for  > 2, the
mode-based upper bound given in (10) is tighter than this latter one based on
stochastic dominance.
The upper bound in Theorem 9 is sharp. For instance, assume that V is
uniformly distributed on [0; 1] so that u(M ) = 1. Then, for any r.v. X on [0; 1],
EU (X ) = E (X ) and (10) holds with equality.
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Theorem 9 gives an upper bound when the support of U is bounded from
below by 0. The next result provides two different upper bounds for the more
general case where SU is simply bounded from below.
Theorem 10 Suppose that V  U is unimodal with mode M . Let U be absolutely
continuous with density function u and inf SU = a > −1. Then both
EU (X )  Eu(X )  (M − a) + P (X > M ) (11)
and
EU (X )  u(M )  P (X  M )  (M − a) + P (X > M ): (12)
Proof. We begin with the first inequality. For v  M ,
u(v)P (X  v) = u(v)
Z
xv
dF (x )

Z
vxM
u(x ) dF (x ) + u(v)
Z
x>M
dF (x )
 Eu(X ) + u(v)P (X > M )
Hence,
P (X  V ) =
Z M
a
u(v)P (X  v) dv +
Z b
M
u(v)P (X  v) dv

Z M
a
[Eu(X ) + u(v)P (X > M )] dv +
Z b
M
u(v)P (X > M ) dv
= Eu(X )(M − a) + P (X > M ):
The proof of the second inequality is similar. For v  M ,
u(v)P (X  v) = u(v)
Z
xv
dF (x )
 u(M )
Z
vxM
dF (x ) +
Z
x>M
u(v) dF (x )
 u(M )P (X  M ) + u(v)P (X > M ):
The rest goes on as above. ut
Inequalities (11) and (12) provide different upper bounds for EU (X ). Com-
paring the two expressions on the right-hand side, it is obvious that which one
is tighter depends on which one is smaller between Eu(X ) and u(M )P (X  M ).
The following example shows that both cases are possible.
Indeed, suppose that V has a Beta c.d.f. with parameters  =  > 1. Then
V is symmetric around its mode M = 1=2. If X takes only values 0 and 1 with
probability 1=2, then
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Eu(X ) = 1
2
u(0) + 1
2
u(1) = 0 < Γ (2)
2Γ ()

1
2
2−1
= u(M )P (X  M ):
This can be used to show that Inequality (11) is sharp. In fact, note that either
Theorem 3 or simple symmetry considerations imply that EU (X ) = 1=2. Thus,
substituting Eu(X ) = 0, M = 1=2 and a = 0 in (11), we find
EU (X ) = 1
2
= Eu(X )(M − a) + P (X > M ):
On the other hand, consider the case where X takes only the values (1=2)−"
and (1=2) + " with probability 1=2. Then
u(M )P (X  M ) = Γ (2)
2Γ ()

1
2
2−1
<
Γ (2)
2Γ ()

1
4
− "2
−1
= Eu(X )
for sufficiently small " > 0 and  > 1. Again, either Theorem 3 or simple
symmetry considerations imply EU (X ) = 1=2. Taking for instance  = 3=2, (12)
gives the upper bound
EU (X ) = 1
2
<
1
4
p

+
1
2
= u(M )P (X  M )(M − a) + P (X > M ):
The bound offered by (12) is sharp. For instance, assume that V is uniformly
distributed on [0; 1] and that X is degenerate on x = 1. Then EU (X ) = 1 =
P (X  V ) = 1 = u(M ) P (X  M )  (M − a) +P (X > M ). However, we suspect
(but have not been able to prove) that it is not sharp (even asymptotically) unless
the support is a singleton.
6 Markov-like inequalities
Most of this section is based on the following generalization of Markov’s in-
equality. See for instance Davidson (1994, Corollary 9.11, p. 132).
Lemma 11 Let g : IR ! IR be a bounded function. Suppose that, for a given
constant a, x  a implies g(x )  g(a)  0. Then
g(a)P (X  a)  E (g(X )): (13)
Similarly, suppose that x  a implies g(x )  g(a)  0. Then
g(a)P (X  a)  E (g(X )): (14)
Proof. The first inequality follows from
g(a)P (X  a) = g(a)
Z
xa
dF (x ) 
Z
xa
g(x ) dF (x )  E (g(X )):
The proof of the second inequality is analogous. ut
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If g is positive and increasing, Equation (13) holds for any value of a . Note
also that (13) implies the weaker inequality g(a)P (X > a)  E (g(X )). Similar
remarks apply to Equation (14) for a positive and decreasing g and for the
inequality g(a)P (X < a)  E (g(X )).
The next result provides bounds on EU (X ) complementary to Jensen’s in-
equality when U has bounded support.
Theorem 12 Let U be absolutely continuous with density function u and SU =
[a; b].
i) If U is convex, then
EU (X )  Eu(X )(b − a): (15)
ii) If U is concave, then
EU (X )  1 − Eu(X )(b − a): (16)
Proof. When U is convex, its density function u is increasing. Hence, applying
the first inequality in Lemma 11,
P (X  V ) =
Z b
a
u(v)P (X  v) dv 
Z b
a
Eu(X ) dv = Eu(X )(b − a):
When U is concave, the density u is decreasing. The weaker form of the second
inequality in Lemma 11 gives
g(a) [1 − P (X  a)] = g(a)P (X < a)  Eg(X );
that is, g(a)P (X  a)  g(a) − Eg(X ). Thus,
P (X  V ) =
Z b
a
u(v)P (X  v) dv 
Z b
a
[u(v) − Eu(X )] dv = 1 − Eu(X )(b − a):
ut
An expected utility maximizer is risk-averse if and only if U is concave.
Assuming risk-aversion, Jensen’s inequality implies U (E (X ))  EU (X ) for any
integrable X . Hence, under the assumptions of Theorem 12, risk-aversion implies
the following bounds on the expected utility of any integrable r.v. X :
1 − Eu(X )(b − a)  EU (X )  U (E (X )):
Similarly, risk-seeking preferences give
U (E (X ))  EU (X )  Eu(X )(b − a):
For instance, assume risk seeking preferences with U (x ) = x 2 on the support
[0; 1]. If the r.v. X has c.d.f. F (x ) = px on the same support, then
U (E (X )) = 19  EU (X ) =
1
5  Eu(X )(b − a) =
2
3 :
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The inequalities in Theorem 12 are sharp. For instance, assume that V is
uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and that X is degenerate on x = 1. Then P (X 
V ) = 1 = Eu(X )(b − a) and (15) holds with equality. The same is true for (16)
if we choose X to be degenerate on x = 0.
More interestingly, the bounds in Theorem 12 are (asymptotically) sharp for
nondegenerate distributions. For instance, take the (convex) power utility function
U (x ) = x (with   1) on the support [0; 1]. For k 2 (0; 1=2), assume that the
r.v. X takes values k and 1 − k with probability 1=2. Then
0  EU (X ) = 1
2

k + (1 − k )  
2

k−1 + (1 − k )−1 = Eu(X )(b − a):
For  ! +1, the right-hand side tends to 0 and the upper bound becomes
asymptotically sharp. Analogous results hold for the second inequality in Theo-
rem 12.
The dual of Theorem 12 is the following.
Theorem 13 Let X  F have an absolutely continuous c.d.f. with density
function f and bounded support SF = [a; b]. If F is convex, then EU (X ) 
1 − Ef (V )(b − a). If F is concave, then EU (X )  Ef (V )(b − a).
7 Moment generating functions
Our last result relies on the moment generating functions.1 Since one is unlikely
to know the moment generating functions better than the underlying c.d.f.’s, its
interest is mostly theoretical.
Given a r.v. X , let MX (t) = E (etX ) be its moment generating function (m.g.f.)
and DX the domain over which MX (t) is defined. Given two stochastically inde-
pendent r.v.’s X  F and V  U , define the r.v. Y = X − V and let H be the
c.d.f. of Y . For all positive t in DX \ DV , we have
P (X  V ) = P (Y  0) =
Z +1
0
dH (y)  E (etY ) = MX (t)  MV (−t):
The following result follows immediately.
Theorem 14 Suppose that the m.g.f.’s of X and V exist. Define the set D =
DX \ DV \ IR +. Then
EU (X )  inf
t2D
MX (t)  MV (−t): (17)
This bound is trivial when the minimizer for the right-hand side is t = 0.
However, if E (X ) < E (V ) < +1, the derivative of MX (t)  MV (−t) is strictly
negative in t = 0 and thus the right-hand side of (17) is strictly decreasing on
some right neighborhood of t = 0. Therefore, the bound is certainly not trivial
whenever E (X ) < E (V ).
1 This approach was kindly suggested to us by Yosi Rinott.
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We consider an example. Suppose that both X and V are exponentially dis-
tributed with parameters respectively  >  > 0. Then E (X ) = (1=) < (1=) =
E (V ). Moreover, their m.g.f.’s
MX (t) = 
 − t and MV (t) =

 − t
are respectively defined for t <  and t < . The minimum of MX (t)  MV (−t)
over D is attained at t = (−)=2 > 0, which gives EU (X )  (4)=(+)2 <
1.
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